From Town Hall.com (Mar. 17):
One -- Reassuring an enemy what one will not do ensures that the enemy will do just that and more. Unpredictability and occasional enigmatic silence bolster deterrence. But President Joe Biden's predictable reassurance to Russian President Vladimir Putin that he will show restraint means Putin likely will not.
Two -- No-fly zones don't work in a big-power, symmetrical standoff. In a cost-benefit analysis, they are not worth the risk of shooting down the planes of a nuclear power. They usually do little to stop planes outside of such zones shooting missiles into them. Sending long-range, high-altitude anti-aircraft batteries to Ukraine to deny Russian air superiority is a far better way of regaining air parity.
Three -- Europe, NATO members, and Germany in particular have de facto admitted that their past decades of shutting down nuclear plants, coal mines, and oil and gas fields have left Europe at the mercy of Russia. They are promising to rearm and meet their promised military contributions. By their actions, they are admitting that their critics, the United States in particular, were right, and they were dangerously wrong in empowering Putin.
Four -- China is now pro-Russian. Beijing wants Russian natural resources at a discount. Russia will pay for overpriced access to Chinese finance, commerce, and markets. Yet if Russia loses the Ukraine war, goes broke, and as an international pariah is ostracized, then China will likely cut the smelly Russian albatross from its neck - in fear of new Western financial, cultural, and commercial clout.
One -- Reassuring an enemy what one will not do ensures that the enemy will do just that and more. Unpredictability and occasional enigmatic silence bolster deterrence. But President Joe Biden's predictable reassurance to Russian President Vladimir Putin that he will show restraint means Putin likely will not.
Two -- No-fly zones don't work in a big-power, symmetrical standoff. In a cost-benefit analysis, they are not worth the risk of shooting down the planes of a nuclear power. They usually do little to stop planes outside of such zones shooting missiles into them. Sending long-range, high-altitude anti-aircraft batteries to Ukraine to deny Russian air superiority is a far better way of regaining air parity.
Three -- Europe, NATO members, and Germany in particular have de facto admitted that their past decades of shutting down nuclear plants, coal mines, and oil and gas fields have left Europe at the mercy of Russia. They are promising to rearm and meet their promised military contributions. By their actions, they are admitting that their critics, the United States in particular, were right, and they were dangerously wrong in empowering Putin.
Four -- China is now pro-Russian. Beijing wants Russian natural resources at a discount. Russia will pay for overpriced access to Chinese finance, commerce, and markets. Yet if Russia loses the Ukraine war, goes broke, and as an international pariah is ostracized, then China will likely cut the smelly Russian albatross from its neck - in fear of new Western financial, cultural, and commercial clout. [read more]
The other realities:
- Americans are finally digesting just how destructive the humiliating flight from Afghanistan was. The catastrophe signaled to Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran that Western deterrence had died.
- The Ukraine war did not cause inflation and record gas prices. Both were already spiking by early February 2022.
- Putin did not invade during the Trump tenure, although he had been more aggressive under previous American leadership with his prior attacks on Georgia, Ukraine, and Crimea.
- It is not "escalation" to send arms to Ukraine. The Russians far more aggressively supplied the North Koreans and North Vietnamese in their wars against America, without spreading the war globally.
- Putin may never fully absorb Ukraine as long as it can easily be supplied across its borders by four NATO countries.
- It is not "un-American" to point out that prior American appeasement under the Obama and the Biden Administrations explains not why Putin wished to go into Ukraine, but why he felt he could.
More articles about the War in Ukraine:
- Facing Unpleasant Facts: What You aren’t Supposed to say about the War in Ukraine
- The Fates of Ukraine and Putin Turn on 7 Forces of History
- Sovereign ‘Democracy’ Ukraine: Zelenskyy Suspends 11 Opposition Parties Becoming Head Of A One-Party State
- Zelensky's record on democracy is looking very dubious
- Ukraine has started using Clearview AI’s facial recognition during war
- Russia's Ukraine war threatens to blow US food prices sky-high
- Dem Nightmare: What if the War Ends Before November?
- Ukraine: What Is in America's Interest?